I introduce irrational types, who are committed to their demands, into a bargaining model with an uncertain deadline for agreement. Rational agents imitate these demands, hoping to benefit from a "tough" reputation. When irrational types are committed to fixed demands and agents are patient, this provides an explanation for "deadline effects" in bargaining: agreement is "U-shaped", occurring either immediately or arbitrarily close to the deadline, and some rational agents fail to agree. I also identify agents' optimal demands when the prior probability of irrationality is small. Maintaining the assumption of types committed to fixed demands, a rational agent should imitate a type that demands half the surplus, regardless of her impatience, to guarantee this payoff as the behavioral perturbation vanishes. If irrational types can commit to time-varying demands, however, then a rational agent should imitate a generalized Rubinstein demand type to secure the associated time zero payoff in the limit. This generalized Rubinstein demand is the limit solution to an alternating offers game in the deadline environment, as the time between offers becomes small; it is a timevarying convex combination of the infinite horizon (no deadline) Rubinstein demand and a half, which converges to a half when the deadline is imminent.
Introduction
Deadlines are a common feature of many bargaining problems and have important effects. The most striking of these are a high frequency of 11 th hour agreements, just prior to the deadline, and frequent disagreement, despite clear mutual gains from a deal. These effects occur even in controlled experiments, as documented in Roth et al. [1988] .
The current paper provides an explanation for these "deadline effects". The two key features of the model are: some (possibly very small) uncertainty about the timing of the deadline, and the presence of irrational agents who are committed to their demands. A rational agent has an * New York University. Email: jack.fanning@nyu.edu. Address: Department of Economics, N.Y.U., 19 West 4 th Street, New York, NY 10012. This is a preliminary version of the paper. Please check my website for updates https : \\ f iles.nyu.edu\ ja f 481\public.
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incentive to imitate the behavior of these "crazy" types, because a reputation for irrationality may convince her opponent to concede to her demands. Such incentives lead to brinkmanship. Rational agents hold out until the deadline is imminent, and uncertainty about the deadline means that some hold out too long.
In addition to analyzing how reputation and deadlines affect the structure of bargaining, it is also interesting to consider how these affect the demands rational agents make: which irrational types should they imitate?
The optimal demand problem is not obvious. Deadlines create a non-stationary bargaining environment: it is very different 6 months before the deadline than when only hours or minutes remain. If irrational types are "simple", in the sense of never changing their demands, then a rational agent must choose carefully. Some demands may seem reasonable at the beginning of bargaining when impatience is the main incentive to reach an early agreement, but unreasonable when the risk of missing the deadline becomes real. How should the two forces that drive early agreements, impatience and deadline risk, be balanced?
If some irrational agents are committed to more "sophisticated" demand profiles, then the problem seems more complex still. Should a rational agent imitate a type that increases its demand close to the deadline in order to create incentives for an opponent to back down earlier? Or should she imitate a type that reduces its demand over time so that it becomes compatible with an irrational opponent's demand, and avoids the risk of missing the deadline altogether? Or should her type perhaps be history-contingent, rewarding an opponent who makes generous offers with generous counteroffers and punishing ungenerous offers in kind?
I provide clear answers to these questions under both simple and sophisticated type assumptions, whenever the prior probability of irrationality is small and certain "optimal types" exist. The possibility of delay and disagreement vanish under these conditions, providing tight bounds on agents' payoffs.
A motivating example for many aspects of the model is the 2011 US debt ceiling negotiations. 1 In May of that year the US Treasury warned that it would run out of money on August 2 unless Congress raised its borrowing capacity. Throughout the summer a tense standoff ensued between Republicans, demanding any rise in the debt ceiling be accompanied by extensive government spending cuts, and Democrats, demanding tax increases in any deficit reduction deal. Only on July 31 was an agreement announced, and only then passed into law on August 2 itself. 2 In addition to raising the debt ceiling, the final deal included spending cuts but no tax increases, and was widely regarded in the press as a major Republican victory. Such success, despite the Democrats controlling both the Senate and White House, was attributed to the Republicans' "irrational" unwillingness to compromise.
Despite the August 2 headline date, there was uncertainty about the true deadline during negotiations, in line with my model. Many Wall Street analysts questioned the Treasury's claims, and predicted the country could remain solvent until August 10, or even August 15; moreover, even the Treasury did not specify a precise default time on August 2. The uncompromising stance of Republicans may have struck some outside observers as crazy, but the reputational advantage of acting "tough" suggests this may have been merely an attempt to gain a strategic advantage, just as the Democrats' insistence on tax rises in any deal ultimately turned out to be a bluff (after all, it worked). More worryingly, the incentives highlighted in the model to hold out when facing an uncertain deadline, suggest the final deal was not inevitable, and future standoffs may well end differently.
The formal model reduces bargaining to the problem of dividing a dollar. Uncertainty about the deadline is captured in a continuous distribution over a finite interval. There are two incentives for agents to reach an early deal: impatience and the risk of missing the deadline. Reputational forces are modelled in a similar manner to Abreu and Gul [2000] (henceforth AG), with some prior distribution of irrational types that are committed to their demands (these are also known as behavioral types, or commitment types). I distinguish between simple types, which are committed to fixed demands, and sophisticated types, which may be committed to time-varying, potentially history-contingent, demands. The paper's first main result is that deadline effects must necessarily occur when agents are patient and behavioral types are simple. The agreement pattern is "U-shaped": deals occur either at time zero or at the 11 th hour, and not in between. Moreover, even rational agents sometimes miss the deadline.
The intuition for this result is that the risk of missing the deadline provides almost the only incentive for patient agents to give up their (valuable) reputation and strike a deal. Conditional on not conceding at time zero, rational agents must therefore hold out on their demands up to the point where that deadline risk becomes real. The deadline's uncertainty, however, means there are incentives to hold out even beyond that point, and some of the agents who do so are unlucky.
Previous literature has highlighted various mechanisms, which might lead to deadline effects; I discuss these in detail in subsection 1.1. None of these papers, however, are closely related to my explanation of reputation and brinkmanship, and therefore I believe this represents an important contribution as applied theory.
Characterizing agents' optimal demands, by contrast, offers new insights both specific to the deadline environment, and for reputational bargaining more generally; I believe these represent the paper's most significant theoretical contribution. Finding optimal types has been a goal of the reputational literature since Fudenberg and Levine [1989] , which shows how a patient longrun player can guarantee her Stackelberg leader payoff against a short run opponent, whenever there is a positive probability of a type committed to the Stackelberg action. To my knowledge, however, this is the first attempt to analyze the "canonical" type problem in a non-stationary environment.
The characterization holds exactly only when the probability of irrationality is vanishingly small. This should, however, illustrate the features of the model which determine outcomes even for larger probabilities of commitment. Alternatively, this limit exercise can be viewed as implementing the minimal perturbation of a complete information bargaining game; the findings can then provide a robustness check on complete information results, or a selection criterion if multiple equilibria exist.
The results: If all behavioral types are simple (fixed demands) then a rational agent should imitate a demand of half the surplus, regardless of her impatience for a deal, to guarantee this payoff as the probability of commitment becomes small. If behavioral types can be sophisticated (time-varying demands) , then a rational agent should imitate a type committed to what I call the generalized Rubinstein demand (Rubinstein [1982] ), to secure the associated time zero payoff in the limit.
The generalized Rubinstein demand is defined as the limit solution to a complete information (no behavioral types) alternating offers game for the deadline environment, when the time between offers becomes arbitrarily small.
3 This is a convex combination of agent i's infinite horizon Rubinstein demand, r j r i +r j (where r i is agent i's discount rate), and 1 2
; it varies over time and converges to 1 2 as agents become convinced that the deadline is imminent.
The intuition for the simple types result is that rational agents should consider how they will behave at 10 seconds to midnight. When the probability of commitment is small, equilibrium requires that bargaining must continue until almost the last possible minute with positive probability. At that point both agents have approximately the same (high) effective impatience for a deal because the deadline is imminent, and so can expect an equal surplus share. Because simple types' demands cannot change, the optimality of demanding 1 2 at the end of bargaining rolls back to the beginning. More precisely, an agent who demands 1 2 builds a reputation (for commitment to her demand) much more quickly than her less generous opponent close to the deadline, because she has less incentive to concede. This stronger reputation at the end of bargaining ultimately means her opponent must concede with high probability at time zero.
The intuition for the sophisticated types result is related to the argument above, but is more subtle. The demand of 1 2 balances agents' reputation building ability close to the deadline, and as noted the Rubinstein demand converges to 1 2 at that point. Working back from there, however, discount rates can play a role if demands can vary. The Rubinstein demand turns out to exactly balance agents' ability to build reputation at all times, not just close to the deadline. The result is driven by two features, which are common to both reputational and alternating offer models. First, they are both symmetric, providing equal innate bargaining power to agents, and second, they both have a strong backward induction logic at their core.
Although these results are novel, they have a close link to the existing reputational bargaining literature. I highlight the most closely related papers here, and discuss others in subsection 1.1. The previously mentioned AG considers only simple commitment types, with agents dividing a dollar in the face of a stationary infinite horizon. The paper's main result shows that a discrete time reputational game converges to a unique continuous time war of attrition game as the time between offers shrinks to zero, regardless of the relative frequency of agents' offers. This finding illustrates how symmetry is a fundamental characteristic of the reputational model. The alternating offer model by contrast, has been been criticized for its sensitivity to assumptions such as the relative frequency of agents' offers: only the "natural" equal offer frequency model treats agents symmetrically as the time between offers becomes small. The paper also shows that rational agents can obtain their stationary Rubinstein payoff, r j r i +r j , as the probability of irrationality becomes small. Abreu and Pearce [2007] (henceforth AP) extend the AG model to allow for sophisticated types when agents bargain over an enforceable long term contract governing play in an infinitely 3 The alternating offer game with a finite number of periods was first investigated in Ståhl [1972] and Ståhl [1977] . repeated game. It finds, however, that such types are irrelevant for payoffs when the probability of irrationality is small, so long as there is a simple type committed to the stationary strategy of always demanding its "Nash bargaining with threats" payoff (Nash [1953] ) and playing its Nash threat action so long as it is refused. The link with Nash bargaining (Nash [1950] ) again highlights the symmetry of the reputational model. Kambe [1999] also emphasizes the relevance of the Nash solution for reputational bargaining. Kambe's model differs slightly from AG: agents can make any demand before facing a fixed probability of becoming committed to it. This results in a unique pure strategy equilibrium with immediate agreement.
In stationary bargaining environments there is a close link between the Nash and Rubinstein demands. The Rubinstein demand may be regarded as the Nash solution with bargaining weights inversely proportional to discount rates. 45 For non-stationary environments, however, there is no general link, as shown in Coles and Muthoo [2003] . Like Nash, the Rubinstein and reputational models treat equal agents equally, but consider discount rates as a legitimate reason to discriminate; the extent of that discrimination is determined by backward induction.
An important implication of my results that differs from the literature is that sophisticated types are relevant: restricting attention only to simple types affects payoffs. AP allowed for sophisticated types, but found these did not affect outcomes when the probability of commitment was small. This suggested the question of whether or not a model should include these types was moot. Here it is live. The modeler must make a substantive assumption about the space of types.
This modelling choice must consider how commitment behavior is motivated. Simple types can potentially be justified as payoff types, agents with different valuations of a deal due to strongly different views of "fairness" for instance, but it is not clear how that would extend to sophisticated types.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the remainder of this section I review additional related literature; section 2 lays out the model; section 3 establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium; section 4 investigates deadline effects; section 5 presents the optimal demand results; and section 6 concludes. Unless stated otherwise, all proofs are in the Appendix.
Further related literature
The reputational bargaining literature grew out of the broader literature of reputational effects in games started by , and . Building on the previously mentioned Fudenberg and Levine [1989] , important contributions in understanding reputational payoff bounds in games with two long run agents are provided in 4 This link may in fact be even closer. Under standard axioms on time preferences, discount factors and utility functions are not uniquely determined. This allows Binmore et al. [1986] to show that under a suitably chosen utility transformation, the two solutions exactly coincide as time between offers becomes arbitrarily small. 5 It may be countered that there appears to be no such link between the models when outside options are present. Even when agents are equally patient and outside options are d i < 1 2 the Rubinstein demand splits the surplus equally, while agent i's Nash solution is
If discount rates are instead interpreted as a constant risk of negotiation breakdown, however, (in which case agents actually obtain their outside option) then i's Rubinstein demand is also
Schmidt [1993] , Cripps et al. [1996] , Celetani et al. [1996] , Aoyagi [1996] and Evans and Thomas [1997] . Myerson [1991] was the first to formally introduce behavioral types into the bargaining problem.
Building on the current paper Fanning [2013a] and Fanning [2013b] consider reputational bargaining in two additional non-stationary environments. Both again consider simple and sophisticated types, finding that a generalized Rubinstein type is canonical in the larger type space.
The first paper employs an infinite horizon, but incorporates uncertainty about the future bargaining environment, which is later revealed. An example is rival political parties negotiating over a deal when there is uncertainty about future bargaining power, due to an upcoming election. With only simple types, agreement may be delayed until after the resolution of uncertainty with probability approaching 1, as the probability of irrationality becomes small. An agent will not concede close to the revelation of uncertainty because if the state of the world turns out to be (relatively) favorable, her opponent will be forced to concede (with high probability). If delay is expected, however, demands will polarize as agents look to maximize their payoffs only in favorable states of the world, which implies even smaller incentives to concede early.
The second paper considers bargaining over multiple issues with multiple deadlines. It provides insights into agenda setting: with either type space a rational agent would prefer the issue which she cares relatively more about to be debated second. Intuitively, this leaves a lower deadline risk for the surplus she cares about most. Notably also, the Rubinstein and Nash solutions for this environment differ even when agents are equally impatient.
Also building on the AG model, Abreu et al. [2012] considers behavioral agents which make simple demands, but differ in the time at which they first announce it. When there is uncertainty about agents' discount rates, non-Coasean outcomes can occur in which patient rational agents delay their initial demands in order to separate from impatient agents.
All the reputational bargaining results above, as well as those in this paper, rely either on some substantive restriction on the space of types, or on an assumption about the transparency of types. Transparency means that rational agents can identify themselves with particular behavioral types. One way to do this is to have agents announce their complete contingent bargaining position at time zero, effectively their type, and to assume behavioral types announce truthfully. Wolitzky [2011] makes an important point about the need for such restrictions. It adapts the AP model with sophisticated types to allow types which distinguish themselves (from other types) only as bargaining unfolds. In particular this means that a "soft" type may exist, outwardly resembling a tough "Nash bargaining with threats" type, but conceding to any opponent's demand probabilistically over time. Being identified with such soft types is not advantageous in bargaining. Indeed, when these soft types are sufficiently prevalent compared to tough types, the paper shows rational agents may never imitate behavioral demands, and almost any efficient, feasible, and individually rational payoff is attainable in equilibrium.
Wolitzky [2012] considers non-stationary commitment demands in an infinite horizon model similar to Kambe [1999] (after making demands rational agents become committed to them with some probability). The paper finds that the maxmin bargaining posture is a fixed surplus share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement. Compte and Jehiel [2002] shows that irrational types have (almost) no effect on equilibrium predictions when their offers are smaller than an opponent's outside option, with agreement between rational agents being reached immediately. Abreu and Sethi [2003] investigates evolutionary stability in reputational bargaining, when there is a small cost of rationality. In any stable outcome there must be complimentary behavioral types, some aggressive and some submissive, and the fraction of rational agents varies with the aggressive agent's demand.
Motivated in part by the findings of the current paper, Fanning [2013c] shows how "reasonable" stationary preferences for fairness can create commitment power. If a seller has preferences for fairness, paying a continuously increasing utility cost for unequal material outcomes, and makes all offers to a buyer whose valuation of a good is uncertain, then the unique equilibrium may be non-Coasean, with high initial prices even as the time between offers becomes small. When the seller may or may not be fair, equilibrium can resemble a war of attrition with normal sellers and high valuation buyers imitating the (potentially non-stationary) commitment behavior of fair sellers and low value buyers. Nonetheless, important differences from the crazy type model remain, such as the existence of equilibria that do not resemble a war of attrition.
Deadlines have of course been incorporated into numerous bargaining models, with those deadlines modeled in many different ways. I focus here on papers that are concerned with deadline effects, that is, delay prior to the deadline and possible disagreement.
Many of the theoretical papers on deadline effects are based on the strategic advantage of presenting an opponent with a final offer or "ultimatum" at the deadline. In particular, in an alternating offer model with a hard deadline in which moderately patient agents must wait to receive offers before making a counteroffer, an initial proposer strategically delays her first (and final) offer until the deadline. Ma and Manove [1993] extends this setup to allow offers to arrive with a stochastic delay, and show the possibility of equilibrium disagreement, and rejection of offers which arrive early. Fershtman and Seidmann [1993] posits that after rejecting an offer an agent becomes committed to not accepting lower ones, perhaps because of the loss of face this would require. This means offers prior to a hard deadline allow an opponent to increase her commitment power. With a random proposer identity in each period, therefore, an agent offers her opponent none of surplus and rejects compromise offers prior to the deadline, in order to secure all the surplus if she proposes at the deadline, and her commitment demand otherwise.
Ponsati [1995] directly assumes a continuous time concession game with a hard deadline. There are only two possible alternatives, one preferred by each agent, and two-sided incomplete information about an opponent's value of conceding, which may be negative. If both agents concede at the same time one alternative is selected at random. The unique equilibrium involves probabilistic concession by both agents at the hard deadline, with this discontinuity creating incentives for both agents not to concede on some open interval strictly prior to the deadline. Simsek and Yildiz [2008] allows for agents who are optimistic (no common prior) about their future bargaining power (for instance regarding proposal rights). A jointly inconsistent expectation of having bargaining power at the deadline and hence extracting a large payoff, causes agreement to be delayed until close to that deadline. Fuchs and Skrzypacz [2012] considers a hard deadline when a buyer has an unknown valuation.
Even as offers become frequent the seller obtains positive surplus by retaining the option to make a final offer at the deadline, where a positive atom of trade occurs.
Spier [1992] investigates a model of pretrial negotiation with one-sided incomplete information about the defendant's liability, and one-sided offers from the plaintiff, who incurs per period fixed costs and an additional fixed cost if the case proceeds to court. Settlement behavior follows a U-shape, agreements occur either immediately or just prior to the hard deadline, and some cases proceed to court. This effect persists even as the plaintiff make offers frequently, because discounting cannot screen between defendant types who would always prefer to pay a given settlement later.
The previously mentioned Roth et al. [1988] empirically demonstrates a deadline effect in a relatively unstructured bargaining experiment: agreement rates spike prior to the deadline and many subjects fail to agree. I compare the results of that paper to the current model in section 4. Ockenfels and Roth [2006] finds somewhat comparable deadline effects in ebay auctions.
The model
In this section, I first outline the structure of the model, before discussing the assumptions, and drawing some some initial conclusions about the nature of any equilibrium. This model is a simplified version of a more general model that is used to prove some of the paper's results.
The fundamentals
Agents 1 and 2 bargain over the division of surplus whose value is 1 (dividing a dollar), and discount future payoffs exponentially at rate r i ≥ 0. There is some deadline t by which time bargaining must be completed or else the surplus is lost. t is distributed according to G on [0, T ], where T < ∞. If the parties attempt to make an agreement at some time t ≤ T , with probability G(t) the deadline has already passed. The distribution is assumed to admit a continuous density g with g(T ) > 0. The assumption r i + g(t) > 0 ensures agents would strictly prefer a given surplus division to be agreed immediately rather than waiting.
The structure of bargaining is as follows: at time zero agent 1 announces a complete bargaining position α 1 ∈ [0, 1] [0,T ] . α 1 (t) details the surplus share which she will demand from agent 2 at time t if a deal has not already been reaching, and the deadline has not already passed. Following this agent 2 can either immediately agree to the offer (1 − α 1 (0)), or make a counter demand α 2 ∈ [0, 1] [0,T ] . Following these announcements agent i can concede to j's current offer (1−α j (t)) at any t ≤ T . If both agents concede at exactly the same time, one of the two proposed divisions is implemented with probability 1 2 .
Reputational dynamics come from a prior probability that agents are irrational, z i > 0. A committed type of agent i is identified by a bargaining position α i ∈ (0, 1) [0,T ] : a type α i always demands α i (t) at time t and accepts any offer greater or equal to that, rejecting smaller offers. C i is the finite set of irrational types, who conditional on irrationality, have probability π i (α i ). I assume that for all irrational types α i (t) is continuously differentiable and does not decline too quickly. By too quickly, I mean that if agent j is certain she faces an irrational agent i, she would always prefer to concede immediately than to wait for a later, more advantageous offer. This is captured by the condition: (1−α i (t))
. I also assume that agent 1's maximal initial type is incompatible with all types of agent 2, max{α 1 (0) ∈ C 1 } + min{α 2 (0) ∈ C 2 } > 1. Simple types' demands satisfy α i (t) = 0, but this need not be true for sophisticated types.
Given the game description above, a rational agent's strategy must describe her initial demand function choice and her decision about when (if ever) to concede to her opponent, given demands. The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Discussion and a preliminary result
I first address the assumption about the stochastic deadline. As I argued in the Introduction, uncertainty about the exact time at which the deadline arrives is natural for many environments. In the example of the 2011 debt ceiling negotiations, this reflected the possibility that the Treasury might have defaulted prior to August 2, or as late as August 15. This distribution may also be arbitrarily close to a hard deadline, however; after fixing ε > 0, a continuous distribution with
Indeed, the uncertainty assumption seems very widely applicable. Even with an ostensibly hard deadline, perhaps midnight on August 2, there will typically be uncertainty about the time it takes to implement a deal which is agreed in principle before the deadline. This positive but uncertain delay may be very small, due to limited computer processing power, or relatively large, due to the many complexities of passing a bill in Congress. The exact time at which payoffs are obtained with delayed implementation differs from the model developed here, however, all the paper's results extend almost without change. Subsection 7.1 of the Appendix outlines the nature of those slight adjustments.
In addition to its intuitive plausibility, the continuity of the deadline distribution ensures that outcomes do not depend on the identity of the agent who has the right to make a final offer before a known deadline. "Almost final" offers with a stochastic deadline, made arbitrarily close to T , concern a situation in which the deadline is almost certain to have already passed.
It is not important whether agents find out if the deadline has passed while they are bargaining, or if they only find out after attempting to make a deal. Even if agents are initially uninformed, they will act on the assumption that the deadline has not passed as their actions only have payoff consequences in that case.
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The second issue which needs to be discussed is the continuous time nature of bargaining. With no behavioral types, in the subgame following demand choices there is a standard war of attrition, allowing multiple equilibria with "always concede" and "never concede", in particular, being equilibrium strategies. Incorporating demand choice, any division of the pie may then be an equilibrium. A discrete time bargaining game, with alternating offers for instance, may result in a uniquely defined outcome even as the time between offers becomes small. Why then would we be interested in the continuous time game?
The answer is that the game defined above represents a series of short cuts and simplifications, 6 A final interpretation of the model is that agents with linear utility bargain over the division of a perishable good, a fraction G(t) of which is destroyed by time t.
which are reasonable to make in the current reputational bargaining context. AG consider a fully discrete time infinite horizon game with simple reputational types, and show that as the time between offers becomes small, all equilibria converge in distribution to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition game, regardless of the relative frequency of agents' offers. I am jumping straight into the continuous time game without reproving the full AG convergence result for the slightly different bargaining environment.
The reasoning behind the AG convergence proof, is that if an agent is ever revealed as rational, and her opponent is possibly irrational, then she must concede almost immediately if the time between offers is sufficiently small. This means that with two sided incomplete information an agent's strategy effectively reduces to "keep imitating a behavioral type" or "concede". The one-sided reputational result was first shown in the bargaining context by Myerson [1991] , although the logic is Coasean (Coase [1972] ) and is sketched below.
Suppose agent i is revealed to be rational at time t * , but does not concede immediately. Then agent i must become increasingly pessimistic about agent j the longer she behaves like an irrational type. Eventually she must be convinced of j's irrationality and concede. Sufficiently close to a final date t by which i must concede, however, (by assumption, bounded away from t * ) even a rational j will not concede. But facing no concession by rational or irrational j agents on [t − ε, t ], i must optimally concede at t − ε, a contradiction.
In the context of my continuous time bargaining game with sophisticated types and deadlines, offers are effectively arbitrarily frequent already, resulting in an immediate, not approximate, concession game structure. This is shown in the lemma below, which is based on the proof of AG, Proposition 5. The assumption about the continuity of the deadline distribution is crucial for this result, meaning that a continuous time concession game structure is only reasonable for this case. If there was no uncertainty about a hard deadline, the necessity of immediate concession would not go through.
To see this, notice that if a certainly rational agent has the right to make a well defined final offer at a future hard deadline T , she could always wait and demand the entire surplus from her possibly irrational opponent at that point. Such non-Coasean possibilities are demonstrated with one-sided discrete time offers in Fuchs and Skrzypacz [2012] : a seller obtains positive surplus when facing a buyer of unknown valuation, and a positive atom of trade occurs exactly at the deadline even as the time between offers becomes small. The nature of equilibrium with a hard deadline, two-sided uncertainty, and two-sided frequent offers is therefore not clear, however, it would seem likely to depend greatly on assumptions about the final offer.
Given the setup of the model, the only time at which agent i could ever reveal herself as rational is at time zero. One can, with some added complexity, also allow agents to reveal rationality without conceding at other times in the (0, T ) interval, while maintaining the continuous time bargaining structure. The lemma above shows that rational agents would never want to take advantage of such opportunities, however. In addition, the lemma implies that an agent's initial demand choice can be reduced to deciding which irrational type to imitate, as if she does not intend to concede immediately she must imitate some type.
Another issue for discussion is the assumption of initial demand announcements: why does each agent have to announce a complete bargaining plan at time zero, instead of making these announcements sequentially over time? Sequential announcement could be be made compatible with continuous time if agents announced a bargaining function on some interval [0, ε), before at t = ε announcing a function to cover demands on [ε, 2ε) and so on.
Making a complete demand announcement at time zero plays an important role in allowing agents to "announce a type". This is related to the issue of transparency discussed briefly in the literature review. Wolitzky [2011] shows in the AP model that if it is not clear which type a rational agent is pretending to imitate, then soft types may initially look like tough types but concede probabilistically over time to any opponent's demand. The risk of getting a soft reputation can destroy any incentive for rational agents to imitate commitment demands.
Transparency problems would not be as severe here, due to the restrictions on even sophisticated types. I have assumed that a rational agent would optimally concede against any particular type, and so she would also concede against an opponent known only to be some irrational type. The result showing that a rational agent can guarantee her generalized Rubinstein payoff as the probability of irrationality becomes small would still go through without transparency, under the sequential bargaining structure outlined above. This would, however, add considerably to the complexity of describing an equilibrium. Full transparency would certainly be needed if some types were committed to discontinuous demands, a possibility I must also address.
I have assumed commitment types belong to a particularly class, essentially continuously differentiable demand functions. The reason for this is simplicity: this class is big enough to illustrate the paper's main results. I extend the model in subsections 5.4 and 5.5 to incorporate types which make discontinuous, and potentially history-contingent demands. The analysis becomes much more complicated, but demonstrates the robustness of earlier results. In that extension, agents announce a complete history-contingent bargaining function at time zero, effectively their type, in order to ensure transparency.
The special interest in simple types is their intuitive plausibility compared to sophisticated types: there seems to be a reasonable way of justifying their behavior as payoff types. The interest in sophisticated types, by contrast, is to allow for a sufficiently broad type space to answer questions about canonical types, those which the model "wants" agents to adopt.
Strategies and utility
As stated above, Lemma 1 implies that strategies can be reduced to rational agents first deciding which types to imitate, and second, deciding at what time (if ever) to concede. It is also without loss of generality to assume that rational agents always concede (weakly) before committed agents. To see this, notice that following initially incompatible demand announcements with continuous demand paths, if α i (t) + α j (t) = 1 at any t > 0 then committed agents concede, and rational agent i is guaranteed at least α i (t) = (1 − α j (t)) in any continuation game by conceding immediately. The assumption r i + g(t) > 0 then implies any delay must strictly decrease one agent's expected payoff, and therefore agreement must always be immediate.
This means a strategy for agent 1, σ 1 , is a probability distribution µ 1 on the set C 1 , describing the bargaining postures adopted by rational agents, and a collection of cumulative distributions
is the total probability of agent 1 conceding to agent 2 by time t following demands α 1 and α 2 ; the behavior of rational agents can be backed out from this. The strategy of never conceding is captured by a concession time of T .
A strategy for agent 2, σ 2 , is similarly made up of µ 2 α 1 on C 2 ∪ {Q} specifying rational 2's counterdemand to α 1 (where Q is immediate acceptance), and F 2 α 1 ,α 2 which describes 2's choice of concession time given demands α 1 , α 2 . Given µ 1 and µ 2 α 1 the posterior probability that agents are irrational after making their demands is given by:
Conditional on a war of attrition being started, with demands α 1 , α 2 , agent i's expected utility from conceding at time t, given an opponent's strategy σ j , is:
A rational agent's utility at the start of the war of attrition is therefore:
Where
, 1 describes a rational agent 1's behavior, with a similar expression for agent 2. Finally a rational agent's expected utility in the full game is:
The equations in 4 are exact analogues of agents' payoffs in AG. The only difference between the games is that the payoff U i (σ|α) is determined in a slightly different manner, reflecting different continuation games. In what follows I frequently drop the subscripts of F i α 1 ,α 2 and other variables, when the context is clear, and also frequently refer to the equilibrium posterior probabilities of irrationality after demand choices, defined in equation 1, as simplyz i .
Equilibrium
I first consider the game with only one irrational type for each agent. The following lemma shows that any equilibrium of the game must satisfy three simple properties. The proof of this lemma is again indebted to Proposition 1 in AG. The basic reasoning behind it is as follows: Both agents must reach probability 1 of irrationality at the same time because a rational agent would concede immediately when certainly facing a committed opponent. Only one agent can concede at time zero because if both conceded, then waiting until an instant after time zero before conceding would strictly increase an agent's payoff, given continuous demands. More generally, concession behavior must be be continuous because mass concession (concession with strictly positive probability) by agent i at any time t > 0, such that α i (t) + α j (t) > 1, would induce agent j to wait to receive a profit bump on the interval [t − ε, t]. But in which case i would prefer to concede at t − ε rather than wait until t to concede, a contradiction. Mass concession could still occur at some T ≤ T such that α i (T ) + α j (T ) = 1. Concession by i is payoff equivalent to concession by j at that point, however, and so to incentivize rational agents to wait until T concession would have to be continuous prior to T (I argued previously that rational agents concede weakly before committed ones, T * ≤ T ). But for agents to concede continuously on an interval (0, T * ) they must obtain constant utility on that interval.
Given the above necessary characteristics of any equilibrium, it is easy to see that an equilibrium exists and is unique. For agent i to be indifferent to concession on the interval (0, T * ), her utility U i (t, σ j |α) from time t concession, defined in equation 2, must be differentiable with respect to t with a derivative of 0. This immediately implies the following equilibrium concession rate for agent j:
means that these types must be incompatible. This uniquely defines F j up to a boundary condition. To close the model let T be the minimum time such that α j (T ) + α i (T ) = 1, or T , if that minimum is not well defined. And letF j (t) be defined as follows for t ≤ T :
In the special case of simple types α j (t) = α i (t) = 0 for all t, this simplifies to:
Where:
records the total probability of concession required by agent j before time t, conditional on j not conceding at time zero. For t ≤ T * , one must therefore have F j (t) given by:
Where (1 − c j ) is the probability that agent j concedes at time zero. Agent j's equilibrium reputation for commitment at t ∈ [0, T * ], is therefore given by:
Wherez j is the probability j is irrational following the demand choice stage; this equals z j when there is only a single commitment type for each agent. Agent j's reputation grows gradually over time according to her rate of concession to i in the war of attrition.
Equilibrium requires both agents reach probability 1 of irrationality at the same time,z j (T * ) = z i (T * ) = 1. These two equations uniquely pin down the equilibrium's two unknowns T * and c i c j , where the latter is a single unknown, given that only one agent can concede with positive probability at time zero.
The intuitive way to solve for this equilibrium, is to work out which agent would "win the race" to become irrational with certainty, assuming no initial mass concession by either agent. Let T j < T be the exhaustion time of agent j, defined as the time by which she must necessarily reach probability 1 of irrationality even without initial mass concession:
> −α j (t) implies bounds on concession rates that ensurê
is continuous and strictly increasing this ensures T j < T is well defined.
Equilibrium then requires that
To ensure that both agents reach probability 1 of irrationality at the same time, we must then adjust the time zero concession of the agent for Figure 1 . The race to become irrational: Agent 1 must concede with probability 21% at time zero.
That is:
I summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the bargaining game with sophisticated behavioral types, if there is a single type for each agent, C
, then there is a unique equilibrium defined by equations 6, 9, 10, 11.
The structure of the equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 . This example features two equally patient agents (r i = 0.25), and a deadline distribution that is focussed on the interval [0.75, 1]. Agent 1 has a higher prior probability of irrationality (z 1 = 0.25 > z 2 = 0.1), and her simple type also makes a more aggressive demand (α 1 = 0.75 > α 2 = 0.5).
The top diagram shows how agents would build reputation absent time zero concession. These "raw" reputations are therefore determined only by the prior probabilities of irrationality and the concession rates given in equation 5. Agent 1's reputation is a thick blue line; agent 2's reputation is a thick dashed red line; the deadline distribution, G(t), is a thin green line.
Initially agents build reputation slowly because the only incentive to back down is impatience, and so only a small concession rate is required to make them indifferent between conceding at one moment and the next. After time 0.75, however, the risk of missing the deadline spurs much faster reputational growth. Agent 2's more generous offer means that she must concede at a quicker rate during the war of attrition, because agent 1 has a higher innate incentive to concede: delaying a payoff of (1 − α 2 ) = 0.5 is more costly than delaying (1 − α 1 ) = 0.25. This means that despite agent 1 having a higher initial reputation, agent 2 reaches probability 1 of irrationality first (exhaustion times: T 2 < T 1 ).
To ensure both agents reach probability 1 of irrationality at the same time in equilibrium, therefore, agent 1 must concede with positive probability (21%) at time zero, boosting her initial reputation. This situation is shown in the bottom diagram, with T * determined by agent 2's exhaustion time T 2 .
The equilibrium requirement that both agents are indifferent between conceding at any time on the interval (0, T * ) implies that rational agent j's utility at the start of the war of attrition is:
This shows agent j can obtain a payoff higher than her opponent's initial offer only when agent i concedes with positive probability at time zero, which occurs only when j wins race to become irrational. It is clearly important therefore, other things equal, to have a low exhaustion time. Agent j's exhaustion time is reduced when she has a higher initial reputation,z j , and when she concedes at a faster rate during the war of attrition. Agent j's concession rate, given by equation 5, is higher when agent i has a higher instantaneous cost of delaying her own concession. This in particular means that it is increasing in agent i's rate of impatience, r i , and the hazard rate of the deadline distribution,
: these are the two forces which make delay expensive. It is also increasing in the generosity of j's offer, (1 − α j (t)), because the delay of a more generous payoff is more costly. It is also larger when agent j's demand is increasing, α j (t) > 0, because delay will mean agent i must concede to a less generous offer in the future. Finally, j's concession rate is decreasing in α i (t) because any concession then becomes more valuable to agent i, meaning less of it is needed to incentivize delay.
The relationship between agents' instantaneous concession rates and the winner of the race to become irrational, is, however, more complicated than this suggests. In particular a demand which increase over time may mean a high initial concession rate, but will also lead to a slower future concession rate because of the less generous future offer it implies. Moreover, making a less generous offer can increase the likelihood that an agent wins the race to become irrational, because this slows down an opponent's concession rate (as well as her own): I explore this possibility in subsection 4.1.
With a unique equilibrium for any subgame with given demands and initial probabilities of irrationality, we can now turn to the demand choice game, and allow rational agents to imitate many different commitment types. This choice must involve agents mixing between different demands so that the conditional probabilities of irrationality after demand choice,z i , result in war of attrition games that guarantee equal payoffs from each imitated demand. The structure of this demand choice game is identical to that presented in AG, with payoffs from choices given by the equations in 4. This allows me to immediately state the following proposition with the proof provided by Proposition 2 in AG.
Proposition 2. In the bargaining game with sophisticated behavioral types an equilibrium exists. Furthermore, all equilibria yield the same distribution over outcomes.
Deadline effects
This section present the paper's first main result: if discounting is relatively small, and types are simple, then deadline effects must necessarily occur. That is, agreements follow a U-shape, occurring either immediately (at time zero) or at the 11 th hour (arbitrarily close to the deadline), and rational agents sometimes miss the deadline entirely. After laying out this result, I illustrate some of the more subtle features of the deadline model in subsection 4.1.
The statement of the result also assumes that the deadline distribution is tightly compressed within a narrow time frame near T . An intuitive understanding of deadline effects presumes such an assumption, however, even a more diffuse distribution leads to agreements arbitrarily close to the unknown deadline, with rational agents failing to agree.
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Both the assumptions of patient agents and a tight deadline distribution are reasonable in many bargaining situations. For instance during the debt ceiling negotiations, the parties impatience for a deal between May and August was most likely negligible compared to their valuation of the terms of any deal, and although any agreement reached before the end of July carried little risk of failure, without an agreement before August 15, default was almost inevitable.
The requirement that types be simple is necessary for the result, and it need not extend to arbitrary sophisticated types. In particular, if the demands of a sophisticated type strictly increased over time, this would induce an agreement density bounded away from zero on the entire interval (0, T * ).
Interestingly, agreements at time zero may often not be apparent to an outside observer, who may believe the parties never had conflicting interests at all. This means the agreement pattern described above may make it appear that whenever parties have conflicting interests, bargaining in the face of a deadline always results in either a last minute deal, or total failure. If conflict ever emerges, it will go right down to the wire.
The intuition for the result is that if agents are patient and there is little risk of missing the deadline, then rational agents have little incentive to give up their (valuable) reputations. This means very little concession is required early on in bargaining to keep agents indifferent between conceding at one moment or the next (see equation 5), because any deadline risk is concentrated around T . And so agreements must take place either at time zero or close to T , if they occur at all. Close to T the risk of missing the deadline does still become large, prompting 11 th hour deals. Nonetheless, the incentive to hold out even after the deadline risk becomes real, hoping a rational opponent will back down first, ensures rational agents must sometimes be unlucky and fail to agree in time.
To clarify this statement slightly: in a mixed strategy equilibrium, reputations can only be weakly valuable after time zero. If it was known that agent i conceded with positive probability at some t ∈ (0, T * ), then in order to ensure both agents still reach probability 1 of irrationality at the same time, agent j would be forced to probabilistically concede just after t. Agent i's reputation would therefore be strictly valuable just after t, making her decision to concede suboptimal. Concession at time zero still occurs because reputation has no value for the conceding agent even in this weak sense (at that point).
I first consider the model with a single simple behavioral type for each agent, and then extend the results to allow for multiple simple types. I define M(t) to be the total probability that agents agree to a deal (weakly) before time t, and therefore in particular, 1 − M(T ) is the total probability that agents fail to reach agreement. 
. Fix any ε ∈ (0, T ) then: Equation 13 says, not all rational agents agree immediately; equation 14 says, no agreements occur on (0, T − ε); equation 15 says, some agreements occur at the 11 th hour; and equation 16 says, some rational agents miss the deadline. The formal proof is very simple, if algebraic. It is based on the fact that for simple types (1 −F i (t)), the total probability that agent i has not conceded by time t conditional on not conceding at time zero, is arbitrarily close to (1 − G(t))
The lemma above takes the commitment types rational agents imitate as given. The proposition below shows a similar equilibrium structure when agents can choose among many different demands. The demand choice problem with multiple commitment types is complicated, with outcomes depending on the relative distribution of irrational types in the population. This means the limiting probabilities with which rational agents reach an 11 th hour deal, or disagree, cannot be given an exact analytical solution. The probability of both of these events must necessarily be bounded above zero, however. This fairly weak bound is due to the generality of the distribution of commitment types permitted, however, these values can be made large in particular examples when the prior probability of aggressive commitment types is also large. 
Where G n − → w δ T represents weak convergence of the deadline distribution to a degenerate hard deadline at time T .
The proof of Proposition 3 is based on Lemma 3. For each subgame in which rational agents make incompatible demands, α 1 + α 2 > 1, with probability bounded away from zero, Lemma 3 implies that agents cannot reach agreement on the interval (0, T − ε], although some make 11 th hour deals and some fail to agree.
All that is required then, is to show that rational agents do imitate some incompatible demands with probability bounded away from zero. In particular, the proof shows that agents imitate their maximal demands with positive limit probability, where maxC 1 + maxC 2 > 1 holds by assumption. To see this for agent 1, notice that if she did not, then she would have a posterior probability of irrationality,z 1 , arbitrarily close to 1, and so any rational agent 2 would necessarily concede to her immediately, giving 1 her best possible payoff (when deviating to imitate maxC 1 with probability 1). Similar reasoning applies to agent 2. Figure 2 illustrates Lemma 3 for the parameters, which were first used in Figure 1 . The deadline in the example is entirely focussed on the interval [0.75, 1], and agents are fairly patient (r i = 0.25). This causes most agreements to occur either at time zero or close to time T . The U-shape of agreement is well defined here, although in general the vertical lines of the U may not have even approximately equal length: all agreements may occur close to time T , or most agreements may occur close to time zero. More than 11% of negotiations fail in this example, even though the probability that two irrational agents meet each other is only 2.5%.
These deadline predictions can be compared to those of the infinite horizon reputational bargaining model of AG. In both models some rational agents do not agree immediately, but with an infinite horizon the density of agreements necessarily decreases over time, and only irrational agents fail to strike a deal eventually. The reason for the first difference is that when only impatience provides incentives for agreement, agents' concession rates are constant, which implies the agreement density is decreasing. The difference in disagreement probabilities is because with a sufficiently long time horizon, impatience always provides sufficient incentives for rational agents to back down.
The findings above can also be (loosely) compared to a bargaining experiment detailed in Roth et al. [1988] experiment being initially designed to study Nash bargaining. The experimental game allowed subjects to reach agreement on the division of lottery tickets. Tickets translated into a probability of winning a prize (rather than nothing) in a binary lottery, meaning that it should be possible to interpret tickets as agents' utilities, no matter how valuable the prize. The value of the prize differed between the two experimental subjects, with prize pairs varying from ($10, $15) to ($4, $36) in different treatments. This setup creates a tension between agreements giving agents equal utility (equal tickets) and those giving agents equal expected monetary value (the low value agent must receive more tickets).
During bargaining unstructured messages could be sent between the subjects via computer. Proposals could also be sent, detailing a division of tickets. Bargaining ended after a deadline of 9 minutes, or when identical proposals were sent by both subjects. Prior to the deadline there was no discounting of payoffs, r i = 0, as these would be realized at the end of the experiment in all cases. The authors' note that the limited processing power of the computers meant the last time at which an agent could agree to another's offer was uncertain. Indeed, the central server recorded some agreements up to 4 seconds after the official deadline (such agreements were honored and recorded at the deadline).
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The most notable findings of the experiment 11 were: agreements shifted towards an equal monetary split rather than equal utilities, a marked lateness in the time of agreements, and a high 10 This setup in fact suggests a hard deadline with a stochastic delay in implementation, a model which is highly related to the current one, and is outlined in the Appendix, section 7.1. The two deadline models are formally equivalent when r i = r j = 0, however, and so the results above remain applicable. In the delayed implementation model the interpretation of the assumption G n − → w δ T is that the probability of any strictly positive delay in implementing a deal becomes arbitrarily small.
11 Other experiments with a similar game structure, which were conducted separately but reviewed in the paper, also found similar results. frequency of disagreement. Despite having nine minutes, almost half of all agreements occurred in the last 30 seconds, with half of those occurring in the last 5 seconds, and half of those occurring in the final second! 22% of subjects missed the deadline.
The marked delay in agreement and the high frequency of disagreement certainly seems to be in line with a reputational bargaining model. One major difference is that there was no obvious probabilistic concession at time zero. This might, however, be explained by a strictly positive time for agents to declare their initial bargaining positions, and also because prior to the last 30 seconds there was almost certainly no risk of disagreement created by computer delays, violating the assumption r i + g(t) > 0. This suggests that any concession prior to the last 30 seconds may be regarded as initial.
Given the setup of the experiment, it would seem reasonable to expect higher value subjects to demand weakly less than half the tickets (α H ≤ 0.5) with low value subject demanding more (α L > 0.5). In this case the model predicts high value subjects should concede at a faster rate than the low value subjects during the war of attrition (regardless of which agent concedes at time zero), and increasingly so as the deadline approaches. Nonetheless, the experimenters record that agreement times do not significantly correlate with the lower prize subject's outcome.
12 Nor do they report a difference between the terms of agreements prior to the last 30 seconds (potentially initial concession) and after that time. Although this seems to be evidence against the model, perhaps its most important implication is the confirmation of mixing among concession times, which is a key prediction. 
More effects of deadlines
This subsection highlights two interesting features of the deadline model, which make it differ from the infinite horizon reputational model of AG. I first show how, other things equal, more aggressive demands can lead to higher time zero concession by an opponent. Second, I show how relatively patient agents always prefer to have any deadline extended. Those eager to reach the model's results on optimal demands, however, can safely skip ahead to section 5.
In the AG infinite horizon model, making a more aggressive demand strictly decreases the likelihood that an opponent will concede at time zero, when holding the opponent's demand and the initial probabilities of irrationality fixed. This makes intuitive sense because a larger demand by agent i reduces the ratio of i's concession rate compared to j's at every point in time, causing j's reputation to grow relatively more quickly; this is shown in equation 21. Nonetheless, in the deadline world the comparative static need not hold. The reason is that larger demands slow down the concession rates of both agents. And this in turn may lead to more of the war of attrition being fought in an environment where "effective" discount rates r i + g(t) 1−G(t) are relatively more favorable to the agent who increased her demand. , r 2 = 1, and z i = e −3 ≈ 5%.
14 The concession rates required to keep rational agents indifferent on the (0, 2) interval are given by:
Initially consider α 1 = 0.7 and α 2 = 0.4. These demands imply that concession rates are equal (to 3) on the interval (0,1) and so exhaustion times are T 1 = T 2 = 1, meaning there is no initial mass concession by either agent.
By contrast, consider what happens if α 2 = 0.5, while retaining z i = e −3 . As a consequence of this more aggressive demand agent 1 concedes faster than agent 2 for t < 1, although both agents concede slower, and so neither reaches her exhaustion time by t = 1. For t ≥ 1, however, agent 2 concedes faster than agent 1 (indeed increasingly so), with the result that 2's reputation overtakes 1's. Exhaustion times are given by T 1 ≈ 1.44 > T 2 ≈ 1.40, meaning agent 1 must make initial mass concession 15% of the time to meet equilibrium requirements; this strictly increases agent 2's expected payoff.
Moving onto the second claim: a more patient agent prefers that the deadline be delayed. With arbitrary sophisticated types it is hard to know how to make this comparison, but it does hold for simple types.
Consider delaying the arrival of the deadline by ε time units in the subgame following initial demand announcements. One way to do this is to extend the model's time horizon backwards so that instead of starting at time zero, it starts at time −ε. Bargaining then occurs on the interval [−ε, T ], although the deadline distribution on [0, T ] is unaffected, in particular G(0) = 0. For given simple demands and probabilities of irrationality this results in exhaustion times that depend on ε as follows. Remembering that T j is defined by the equationF j (T j ) = 1 −z j one gets:
Assuming that T j = T * one can then assess the effect on initial mass concession given that
If r i > r j this is negative, and so agent i must increase her initial mass concession as ε increases, whereas if the reverse inequality holds she reduces initial concession. This implies that the patient agent unambiguously benefits from this shift in the deadline distribution, and the impatient agent suffers, for all demands. The logic behind the result is that shifting the deadline into the future ensures that more of the war of attrition is fought on grounds favorable to the patient agent, when discount rates but not deadline risk, determine concession rates. The finding seems very intuitive.
At t ∈ (0, T * ) bargaining is comparable to a situation at time zero when neither agent makes mass concession. This means the result can be extended to consider an unexpected event at t, which shifts the deadline distribution in to the future. This would cause the impatient agent to immediately concede with positive probability, so that both agents continue to reach probability 1 of irrationality at the same time. If the event instead brought the deadline distribution forward then the patient agent would be forced to concede. The first implication of this is that patient agents should seek out technologies that push back the deadline, and impatient agents should look to bring it forward (assuming this still leaves time for an agreement). The second implication is that sudden changes in information can spur an immediate deal, even when that information suggests that agents now have more time to make a deal.
Optimal demands
This section characterizes agents' optimal demands when the prior probability of irrationality is small and the type space is sufficiently rich. I first restrict attention to simple types, and then address sophisticated types. After providing some simple comparisons of the limit results derived, I finally test their robustness by extending the model to allow types which make discontinuous, history-contingent demands.
Simple types
The main result with simple types is that when the prior probability of commitment is small and the space of types is rich, both agents can obtain half the surplus, regardless of their relative discount rates and regardless of the relative likelihood of particular types. This is proved in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4 (Optimal simple types).
Let E n = {G, T, r i , C i , π i , z i n } i=1,2
be a sequence of bargaining games with only simple behavioral types in which z
Proof. Given a sequence of bargaining games with z i n → 0, and initial demand choices from a finite set, the probability of making a particular choice must converge to some limit (taking a subsequence if necessary). + ε with positive probability in this limit, then agent 2 can obtain within ε of a half by accepting immediately. If agent 1 makes a demand α 1 > 1 2 + ε with positive limit probability, then for any counterdemand made by agent 2, there is a bound on the posterior probabilities of irrationality for the two agents. That is, z 1 z 2 < L 2 sufficiently close to the limit, for some positive constant L 2 . In particular, consider what happens if agent 2 always mimics a type such that |α 2 − 1 2 | ≤ ε.
The simplified expression forF i (t) for stationary types is defined in equation 7, with K i defined in equation 8. These reveal thatF i (t) < 1 for all t < T , butF
In equilibrium mass concession is defined by equation 11, which means that:
The second of the above equalities comes from plugging in forF i (t) using equation 7. The inequality then comes from the bound on¯z 1 z 2 and the fact that T * < T < ∞. Given α 1 > α 2 , the right hand side of the above equation converges to 0 as T * → T , because G(T * ) → 1. This entails, not only that agent 2 wins the war of attrition, but that she does so with probability approaching 1. This establishes a lower bound for agent 2's limit payoff.
By demanding arbitrarily close to 1 2 agent 1 can guarantee that either she faces a counterdemand arbitrarily close to 1 2 , or she wins the ensuing war of attrition with probability approaching 1, with this proved in identical fashion.
The intuition for the result is that when the prior probability of irrationality is small, reputations are overwhelmingly built at the last possible minute, close to T . An agent making a more generous offer builds reputation much quicker than her opponent at that point, with this advantage implying her opponent must concede with high probability at time zero.
Elaborating on this explanation, notice that close to time T agents have almost the same (high) effective impatience for a deal because the deadline is imminent: their effective discount rates,
, are exploding at the same rate. This means that if agent j's offer is more generous than agent i's, (1 − α j ) > (1 − α i ), then agent i has a higher innate incentive to concede immediately, as she stands to lose more from delay. This in turn implies that agent j must concede (much) faster than i close to T to preserve agents' indifference to concession on the interval (0, T * ): her concession rate, given in equation 5, explodes at a faster rate. And so agent j builds reputation much faster close to T and wins the race to reach probability 1 of irrationality (absent time zero concession). To ensure both agents reach probability 1 of irrationality at the same time, therefore, requires i to concede with high probability at time zero.
The arguments above are predicated on the war of attrition continuing until almost time T . But when the probability of irrationality is small, this must be the case. The reason is that concession rates are bounded on the interval (0, T − ε], with ε > 0, because the hazard rate of the deadline distribution is bounded here. This means i's total probability of concession by T −ε, conditional on no concession at time zero, must be bounded away from 1. In turn, this implies reputations for commitment at T − ε absent time zero concession, given by¯z
, are small whenever the initial probability of commitment,z j , is small. Exhaustion times, defined as the point at which reputations must reach probability 1, must therefore be arbitrarily close to T in the limit.
Despite this explanation, the finding that agents' limiting payoffs do not reflect discount rates at all is somewhat surprising. I previously showed in subsection 4.1 that with simple types, patient agents always prefer to extend the deadline further into the future. Proposition 4, however, shows any deadline extension effect is entirely second order when the probability of commitment is small. In answer to the question proposed in the introduction "how should the optimal demand tradeoff impatience and deadline risk?", this says that deadline risk overwhelms any effect of impatience, and affects both agents equally, meaning both should receive half the surplus.
Sophisticated types
The paper's next main result is that when behavioral types are sophisticated, rational agents can guarantee their generalized Rubinstein bargaining payoff as the probability of commitment becomes small. To prove that result, however, first requires explaining what the generalized Rubinstein demand is.
The complete information alternating offers game
Consider a complete information alternating offers bargaining game for the stochastic deadline environment. That is, temporarily assume that there are no behavioral types, and there is a bargaining structure that resembles Rubinstein [1982] .
In this complete information alternating offers game each agent makes N offers, with ∆ time units between when agent i makes an offer and when j can make counteroffers (following a rejection), so that 2∆N = T .
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This game can be solved by backward induction. Agent 2's final offer must demand the entire surplus, at which point her present discounted expected utility if the deadline has not yet passed is v 2 (T − ∆) = 1. Other values are then defined recursively to ensure agent j is indifferent between accepting i's offer at time t, or waiting one period to make her own counterdemand.
Proceeding heuristically, we plug v 2 (t + ∆) into the equation for v 1 (t) to obtain the equality:
Dividing each side of this equation by ∆ and taking the limit as offers are made frequently using l'Hopital's rule, defines a linear ODE for t ∈ [0, T ):
Using the boundary condition lim t→T v 1 (t) ∈ [0, 1] gives the generalized Rubinstein solution:
This is a convex combination of the stationary infinite horizon Rubinstein solution, . It may seem surprising that demands converge to 1 2 at time T when agent 2's final demand is always 1. Intuitively, the probability that the final period is reached before the deadline hits converges to zero as ∆ becomes small, and so this single period becomes unimportant in determining the outcome. Moreover, close to T agents have approximately the same per period discount factor, e −r i ∆ ≈ 1, but the conditional probability that the deadline will arrive soon remains large. In particular, consider agent 1's final demand at T − 2∆: the conditional probability that the deadline hits before 2's final demand is approximately Finally, notice that this Rubinstein demand implies that a relatively patient agent would always prefer the deadline distribution be pushed further into the future, a similar observation to that made in subsection 4.1 for reputational bargaining with simple commitment types.
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The reputational result
We now return to the reputational bargaining model. Let α 1 * (t) = v 1 (t) be defined by equation 24 above and α 2 * (t) = 1 − v 1 (t). I henceforth define these as the Rubinstein bargaining positions. With this definition in place, we are ready: suppose there is a sophisticated type who is committed to the Rubinstein bargaining position, then rational agents can guarantee the associated time 16 To see this, extend the bargaining horizon backwards to [−ε, T ] as before, and assume r 2 > r 1 . This implies 2v 1 (−ε) = (r 2 + r 1 )v 1 (−ε) − r 2 < 0, where the last inequality holds because v 1 (−ε) < zero payoff, when the probability of irrationality is small, regardless of the relative distribution of types. 
Proposition 5 (Optimal sophisticated types). Let E n
= {G, T, r i , C i , π i , z i n } i=1,2
be a sequence of bargaining games with sophisticated behavioral types in which z
Proof. Again considering a subsequence if necessary, so that limit probabilities are well defined, consider the problem for agent 2 (the proof for agent 1 is much the same). If agent 1 offers more than α 2 * (0), the bound is obtained by acceptance. If on the other hand agent 1 makes a demand α 1 (0) > 1 − α 2 * (0) with positive probability in the limit, then for any counterdemand there is a bound on the posterior probabilities of irrationality for the two agents, L 2 >¯z 1 z 2 sufficiently close to the limit. In particular, consider what happens if agent 2 always mimics type α 2 * .
As previously, let T be the minimum time such that α j (T ) + α i (T ) = 1, or T if that minimum is not well defined. As defined in equation 6,F i (t) < 1 for all t < T , butF
Let the difference between an agent's demand and her opponent's offer be l(t) = α 1 (t)+α 2 (t)−1, and so (1 − α 1 (t)) = α 2 (t) − l(t) and α 1 (t) = l (t) − α 2 (t). Equation 11, which defines initial mass concession, then implies:
The second line merely uses the expressions forF i (t) defined in equation 6. The third line follows from substituting variables involving α 1 (s) for counterparts involving l(s) and rearranging terms. The fourth line follows from the definition of the ODE which determines the Rubinstein bargaining position, equation 23. The fifth follows from integration and the bound on¯z must win the war of attrition, and receives initial mass concession with probability approaching 1.
The above proof appears almost too slick. To understand the reasons behind it we must consider agents' incentives to concede, which determine concession rates, and hence their ability to build reputation. Some insight can be gained from the previous result with simple types, Proposition 4. The optimality of the demand of 1 2
, was because this balanced agents' incentives to concede to each other, close to time T ; the Rubinstein demand also converges to 1 2 at T . The Rubinstein demand, however, turns out not just to balance agents' incentives to concede close to T , but at all points in time. This loosely means that demanding more than an opponent's Rubinstein offer leads to a comparatively slow concession rate. This in turn ensures that such an agent would lose the race to reach probability 1 of irrationality, and so must concede with high probability at time zero.
To make this argument more concrete, first impose equality between (the numerators of) agents' concession rates at all points in time:
Then impose compatibility of these demands, α i (t) = (1 − α j (t)):
The second line of equation 25 is merely a rearrangement of the first. It is also, however, the ODE that defines the Rubinstein bargaining position.
Next, consider the ratio of agents' concession rates, defined in equation 21. Given the construction above, it is clear that for agent j to demand more than her Rubinstein demand and concede at a faster rate (at time t) than agent i, who makes her Rubinstein demand, j must be increasing her demand faster than her Rubinstein demand would (α j (t) > α j * (t)). This, however, implies an even more aggressive demand in the future, which will put agent j at a greater disadvantage with respect to future concession rates. The proof of Proposition 5 shows that this short term advantage and long term disadvantage cannot pay.
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As to why the Rubinstein demand exactly equalizes agents' concession rates, the answer lies in the two properties which characterize it, symmetry and backward induction. Any demand which balances agents' incentives to concede must be symmetric in some sense. If demands can change over time, however, then tomorrow's demand also affect today's incentive to concede: a higher future demand increases the incentive to concede early, and a lower future demand increases the incentive to delay. For a demand profile to balance incentives to concede at all 18 Nonetheless notice that for larger probabilities of irrationality, if a Rubinstein type faced a commitment type with an equal and large likelihood of rationality, which demanded slightly more than the Rubinstein demand initially and then rapidly increased its demand to 1, then
l(0) could be much larger than 1, and so the Rubinstein agent might need to make initial mass concession. times consistently, therefore, it must be based upon backward induction. Clearly backward induction is at the core of the alternating offers model, and this solution is also symmetric (agent's have equal bargaining power) when the time between offers is small (if agents' offers are equally frequent).
AG first established the importance of symmetry in reputational bargaining, when showing the convergence of the discrete time reputational game to a unique continuous time game, regardless of the relative frequency of agents' offers. Backward induction meanwhile, has been at the heart of reputational games since their earliest days.
In response to the question: "how should the optimal demand balance impatience and deadline risk?" Proposition 5 provides a different answer to Proposition 4. The optimal demand should continuously adjust over time to account for them both. The reasoning behind the differing conclusions is very similar, however: the optimal demand should be as aggressive as possible, conditional on providing an opponent with greater incentives to concede, at least in the long run.
Comparison of simple and sophisticated results
This subsection presents a simple example to illustrate the importance of non-stationarity for the Rubinstein commitment demand, and to provide a point of comparison between Propositions 4 and 5. It then considers the implications of assuming that sophisticated types are much less likely than simple types.
The example assumes there is only one type for each agent and z i = 5%. The deadline distribution is uniform on [0, 1] with r 1 = 1 and r 2 = 3. This means the Rubinstein demand reduces to:
The initial Rubinstein demand is therefore α * 1 (0) ≈ 0.64. Numerical calculations reveal that if agent 1 imitates this Rubinstein type while agent 2 imitates the simple type α 2 = 0.5, then agent 2 must make time zero concession with probability 74%. If, however, agent 2's type remains α 2 = 0.5 but agent 1's type is now simple and committed to the initial Rubinstein demand, α 1 = α * 1 (0), the situation is entirely reversed, and agent 1 must concede at time zero with probability 73%.
I mentioned in the Introduction that sophisticated types appear to have a less obvious payoff type justification than simple types. What if this simply meant that they were much less likely? One way to address this question is by supposing the prior probability of sophisticated types converges to zero faster than that of simple types.
In particular, I consider r i < r j and simplify to one type for each agent, so that agent j is committed to α j = 1 2
, and agent i is committed to her Rubinstein demand minus ε, α i (t) = α i * (t) − ε, for which ε = 0 is a special case. Let z
for some positive constant L, and p > 1. This assumption riggs the game heaving in favor of agent j, she must become infinitely more likely to be irrational than her opponent in the limit. These assumptions imply that time zero concession is governed by:
Where the final line imposes α j = 1 2 and α i (t) = α i * (t). z j n → 0 implies that T * → T where T ≤ T is defined as the first time such that α i (T ) + α j (T ) = 1. The numerator of the integrand in the above equation must therefore converge to:
If ε = 0 then T = T , and so for T * close to T this is negative and of arbitrarily large magnitude given p > 1. This ensures that the entire integral converges to −∞ and consequently c i → 0.
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This means the Rubinstein demand agent must concede with probability approaching 1 to the simple demand of α j = 0.5, if her probability of irrationality converges to zero even slightly faster.
But this is not the final word on the matter. If ε > p−1 2 the numerator of the integrand at T < T is certainly positive, remembering that r j > r i . This implies c j → 0, and so agent j must concede with probability approaching 1, despite j having an infinitely higher initial reputation. Sophisticated types can affect outcomes even when they are much less likely than simple types.
Of course, this in turn does not imply that agent i can guarantee α i * (0) − ε for arbitrary simple types of agent j, as a demand α j < 1 2 would change the equation once again. Finding optimal limit demands for simple and stationary types in this setting would seem a very difficult task. I expect that demand optimization with multiple types will lead to a result that depends heavily on the identity of agent 1 and 2, with a significant second mover advantage.
Very sophisticated types
The sophisticated types considered thus far have been restricted to continuously differentiable demands. This section provides a robustness check to the Rubinstein bargaining result (Proposition 5) when allowing for types making discontinuous, history-contingent demands. I call these agents very sophisticated types.
To do this, I abandon the continuous time framework above, and instead consider discretecontinuous time. This is an invention of AP, which allows for continuous time bargaining 19 To see this choose t close to T such that the integrand is negative. On (0, t ] the integral is bounded. On the remaining interval (t , T * ) bound the denominator on the integrand from above α i (t) + α j (t) − 1 < , and similarly bound from above the terms multiplying r i and r j in the numerator. Observe that the sum of the terms multiplying
1−G(t) is bounded above by − p−1 2 . Integrating with such bounds imposed and taking the limit as T * → T then gives the desired result.
with discontinuous demands, while avoiding "openness" problems. The setup offers a better approximation of the limit of a discrete time game as the time between offers becomes small, than true continuous time, in the sense that in discrete time there is always a "last time" that an agent can concede to her opponent's old demand, and a "first time" that she can concede to a new demand.
The discrete part of the discrete-continuous time comes from the existence of a finite set of times t 1 , t 2 , ..., t m within the interval (0, T ) which have a special structure. The single time t k is divided into four discrete times t k,−2 < t k,−1 < t k,+1 < t k,+2 . If bargaining is not concluded before time t k,−2 both agents can concede to their opponent's existing demand. At t k,−1 one agent alone, say i, has the choice of conceding to j's existing demand, not conceding and reaffirming her bargaining position, or changing her bargaining position to some new α i describing her demand on the interval [t k,+2 , t k+1,−2 ]. At t k,+1 the other agent j has the opportunity to (alone) concede to her opponent's (possibly new) demand, not concede and reaffirm her position, or change her bargaining position. At t k,+2 both agents can again concede to their opponent's (possibly new) demand.
The identity of the agent who can move at t k,−1 rather than t k,+1 is arbitrary for each k, but is known to agents. There is no discounting across the times t k,−2 , ..., t k,+2 , their structure is similar to the assumption that agent 1 announces her initial demand marginally before agent 2, even though both events are recorded at time zero. The existence of these discrete times also reintroduces the possibility that an agent initially imitates a behavioral type, before revealing rationality at t k,+/−1 without conceding.
Using this new time structure, I represent a very sophisticated behavioral type's bargaining position on the interval [t k,+2 , t k+1,−2 ] as a function (0, 1) [t k,+2 ,t k+1,−2 ] , with the choice of function possibly depending on the entire history of play prior to the time she changes her demand (at t k,+/−1 ); I interpret 0 = t 0,+2 and T = t m+1,−2 . I maintain the assumption (1
Whichever agent can move at t k,−1 can concede to her opponent's t k,−2 demand; the agent who can move at t k,+1 can concede to her opponent's t k,+2 demand. If a behavioral agent would change her demand at t k,+/−1 in such a way that it would be compatible with her opponent's existing demand, I assume she instead immediately concedes. I also now assume that at time zero each player announces their their entire contingent bargaining function, effectively their type, and behavioral types report truthfully.
To simplify matters, suppose that agent R always imitates the Rubinstein demand, but agent NR need not. This means Lemma 1 applies to agent NR: she must concede immediately if revealed to be rational when R is possibly irrational. The same need not be true of agent R, however. In particular if R is revealed to be rational, but irrational NR's demand is expected to discontinuously jump downwards at t k,+/−1 (assuming R continues to behave as expected) R may not concede to NR immediately, but instead wait for NR to lower her demand. This implies that equilibrium must involve either both agents reaching probability 1 of irrationality at the same time or agent NR reaching this level strictly before R (with R then waiting for a downwards expected demand jump).
Not only will R not necessarily concede immediately after revealing rationality at t k,+/−1 , but revealing rationality may induce a lower future demand from her opponent (compared to if she had maintained her Rubinstein position) given history-contingent demands by an irrational agent NR. It may also mean that a rational agent NR will optimally reveal rationality without conceding after R has done so, rather than continuing to imitate her irrational type, which is set to lower its demand in the future.
Continuation payoffs after both agents reveal rationality without conceding depend on the complete information, discrete-continuous time game. This has multiple equilibria that can depend arbitrarily on the past history of play, creating some indeterminacy in the reputational game.
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Nonetheless, agent R's continuation payoff in any given equilibrium, v R (t k,+/−1 ), when she reveals rationality first at t k,+/−1 (without conceding), can be treated as if exogenous to the model. The expected continuation payoff for a rational agent NR when R does this, is similarly given by v NR (t k,+/−1 ). Given this protocol, although irrational NR's demand can depend on R's behavior, I refer to α NR (t) as NR's demand at t when R has always imitated the Rubinstein type prior to t, without confusion.
With discontinuous demands, equilibrium may now result in mass concession at times other than 0. In the simplest case when irrational agent NR's demand is expected to jump upwards at t k,+/−1 and has no other discontinuities, there may by mass concession by NR at t k,+2 with probability (1 − c NR k,+2 ) > 0 such that:
This concession behavior makes agent R indifferent between concession at t k,−2 or an instant after, at t k,+2 .
Equilibrium may also involve gaps of waiting by both parties followed by probabilistic concession at a later date. The simplest variety of this occurs when agent NR's demand discontinuously drops only once at t k,+/−1 such that α R (t k ) + α NR (t k,+2 ) > 1. In this case equilibrium can involve both agents ceasing to concede on the interval (t , t k,−2 ] where t ≥ 0 is determined by:
To compensate agent NR for waiting on this interval, agent R then concedes to the demand α NR (t k,+2 ) at t k,+2 with probability (1 − c R k,+2 ) so that:
Even stranger things can happen when (1 − α
, in that both agents wait on some interval (t , t k,−2 ] before agent R probabilistically reveals rationality without conceding at t k,+/−1 to obtain v R (t k,+/−1 ), and if she does not then NR concedes with positive probability to the demand α R (t k ) at time t k,+2 to ensure R was indifferent between revealing rationality or not at t k,+/−1 . The upshot is that both agents reveal rationality (first) at time t k with 20 This is a clear diference between the discrete continuous time game and considering the limit of a discrete time as the period length becomes small.
strictly positive probability.
The nature of these occurrences is explored more thoroughly in AP. Here I simply press on to state the robustness result: as the probability of irrationality becomes small, agents can still guarantee their Rubinstein bargaining payoff.
agent announces a demand which she cannot retract for one full minute, but she can concede to her opponent's demand at any point during that minute, be it after 5 seconds, or 27 seconds. Demands are made at discrete times and concession occurs in continuous time.
With this alternative interpretation, Proposition 6 supposed that an agent could announce a demand function at each discrete time, detailing how her offer changed in continuous time, so that her offer after 5 seconds or after 27 seconds could differ. It is, however, also of interest to consider the implications of allowing only fixed demands at discrete times, forcing agents offers after 5 or 27 seconds to be alike.
Let the bargaining structure be identical to that used in Proposition 6 except that at t k,+/−1 agents can only announce constant demands on each interval [t k,+2 , t k+1,−2 ]. Behavioral types demands may still still be discontinuous and history-contingent, although they must respect the bargaining protocol. I call these agents constrained sophisticated types: they are a hybrid of simple and very sophisticated types. I again assume that agents announce a complete, history-contingent demand at time zero, i.e. their type. These assumptions are in fact closer to AP than those of Proposition 6: AP do not allow continuously differentiable demand announcements between integer times. These assumptions imply that agents can guarantee a payoff of 1 2
as the probability of commitment becomes small. . This is necessarily more generous than agent j's offer whenever demands are in conflict, and so if the war of attrition is still going on close to T , i must be conceding at a (much) faster rate, ensuring that she wins the race to become irrational first. Alternatively, if agent j decreases her demand to make it compatible with agent i's, at some discrete time t k,+/−1 < T then rational agent i (if she has not already conceded) will wait to receive this concession on the interval [t k,−2 − ε, t k,−2 ], for some ε > 0, even when her opponent is certainly irrational. A rational agent j, however, would prefer to get 1 2 at t k,−2 − ε rather than wait to receive it at t k,+/−1 , and so must reach probability 1 of irrationality before t k,−2 − ε. But using the logic of Proposition 6, j's total concession probability is bounded away from 1 between time 0 and time t k,−2 −ε, absent time zero concession. As the probability of commitment becomes small, however, j must concede with probability approaching 1 before t k,−2 − ε, and so must be conceding at time zero (with probability approaching 1).
m be a sequence of bargaining games with constrained sophisticated types in which z
This result might seem to turn things upside-down all over again, because the assumption of a fixed demand on some small interval, combined with continuous concession opportunities on that interval is intuitively appealing. Its implication is more nuanced, however, and concerns the order of limits. Proposition 7 assumes that the number of times at which agents can change demands is held fixed at m, before taking the fraction of irrational types to zero (subsequently taking m to infinity clearly does not change the result). Proposition 6 by contrast effectively first allows the time between agents' offers to converge to zero (m converges to infinity) while allowing only a finite number of discontinuities in the limit, and only then takes the probability of commitment to zero. Which solution is more reasonable depends, in part, on the respective convergence speeds of irrationality and offer frequency.
Conclusion
The results of the current model do not suggest a way out of partisan brinkmanship in Washington DC in the face of fiscal deadlines. Indeed, if politicians' impatience for a deal is relatively small, the results suggest some sort of deadline effect may be inevitable, with a positive probability of an 11 th hour deal, and a risk of failure by rational agents. Clearly the analogy should be treated with great caution, however, as the model is a drastic and imperfect simplification of forces that may be at work in such an environment, with no role for blame, or elections. Also, the model does not address reputational bargaining in a repeated game framework. This suggests an avenue for further work, which must consider how agents might recover reputation after revealing rationality.
In addition to illustrating deadline effects, the model pins down agents' optimal demands when the probability of irrationality is small. This is the first characterization of canonical bargaining types in a non-stationary environment, and the findings highlight key features of reputational bargaining that are partially obscured by a stationary infinite horizon. In particular, there is a strong link between between reputational bargaining and the alternating offers model due to the properties of symmetry and backward induction, which characterize both. Building on this paper, Fanning [2013a] and Fanning [2013b] find the generalized Rubinstein demand is canonical in other non-stationary environments, illustrating the robustness of the result.
The very different limit predictions with simple and sophisticated types implies the space of types considered is a substantive modelling choice. In light of this, determining a plausible motivation for the commitment behavior of sophisticated (and simple) types seems an important avenue for further research. In part motivated by the findings of this paper, Fanning [2013c] shows how (non-stationary) commitment demands can be motivated in a Coasean bargaining model when rational sellers have continuous preferences for equal material payoffs, although important differences from the crazy type model remain.
Appendix

The delayed implementation model
This section presents the outlines of a model in which there is a known hard deadline at time T , but agreements take an unknown time to implement. The model is closely related to the one in the paper, and is formally identical when r i = r j = 0.
After agreement on the principles of a deal at time t, the time it takes to implement a deal is distributed according to G on the interval [t, T + t] with the continuous density. The density for a deal to be implemented at time t + w given agreement at t is g(T −w), where I continue to assume that g(T ) > 0 although this can be easily generalized to allow the delay from implementation to always be strictly positive. This means that the probability of implementing a deal before the deadline of T is:
Agent i's expected utility from a deal agreed at time t that gives her α i (t) of the surplus is:
Under this utility formulation, Lemma 1 goes through without change: a rational agent must concede immediately to an agent who might possibly be committed to her demand. This reduces strategies to a choice of commitment type to mimic, and a concession time.
Given demands and agent j s strategy, agent i s expected utility from concession at time t is given by:
The arguments of Lemma 2 again go through requiring agents to reach probability 1 of rationality at the same time T * < T and to be indifferent to conceding on the interval (0, T * ]. Differentiating the above equation gives the required equilibrium concession rates:
This allows us to defineF j (t) as before as the concession up to time t assuming no time zero concession.
In the particular case of simple types this reduces to:
Where K j is defined as before. With this newF j exhaustion times and time zero concession are defined exactly as before, characterizing the unique equilibrium. Notice that:
This means that as r i becomes arbitrarily small, 1 −F j (t) becomes arbitrarily close to (1 − G(t)) K j ensuring Lemma 3 and Proposition 3 go through unchanged. It is also clear the above bound ensures the proof of Proposition 4 also goes through as before, with rational agents guaranteeing half the surplus as the probability of commitment becomes small. The Rubinstein bargaining demand in this setting is defined by:
Using the same trick as in Proposition 5 of defining l(t) = α i (t) + α j (t) − 1, the proof that each agent can secure her Rubinstein payoff when such a sophisticated type exists then works exactly as before. As T * → T , time zero concession by agent 1 must converge to probability 1 when agent 2 imitates the Rubinstein type:
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 I first prove that there exists a t < T such that i must have agreed to j's demand by time t , assuming j has always behaved in a way consistent with the commitment type.
this is well defined by continuity and strictly less than 1 by assumptions made about irrational types' demands. Letz j (t) record agent j's conditional probability of irrationality at time t when she has always previously behaved like the irrational type, and finally let π j (t 1 ,t 2 ) be the total probability that agent j continues to behave like the irrational type on the interval [t 1 ,t 2 ), conditional on having done so beforet 1 .
Att 1 ∈ [t * , T ) such that j has always behaved like the irrational type, a rational agent can obtain utility of at least (1 − α j ) conditional on the deadline not having passed. Given the probability that agent i does not change her demand on [t 1 ,t 2 ), there is a bound on the maximum expected payoff from waiting untilt 2 (given that the deadline has not passed byt 1 ). For it to be optimal for agent i not to concede to agent i prior tot 2 then requires:
This gives a bound on the size of π j (t 1 ,t 2 ):
Fixing δ ∈ (α j , 1), for anyt 1 , it is clear that there always exists somet 2 < T such that π j (t 1 ,t 2 ) < δ. For such a fixed δ there clearly exists a K such that δ K <z j (t * ). After K iterations of the above argument, letting t * = t 1 , we havē t 1 , ...,t K+1 < T such that the above equation defines π j (t i ,t i+1 ) ≤ δ. This means that the probability that agent i has continued to behave like an irrational type until timet K+1 must be less than δ K <z j (t * ). However, given that the probability of behaving like an irrational type untilt K+1 must be weakly greater thanz j (t * ) this is a contradiction. And so rational agent i cannot possibly wait until timet K+1 to concede. This proves the initial claim (that i must concede by some t < T ).
I shall now prove that the latest time that agent i can concede to j's demand is in fact t * . Suppose not.
Let,t 1 ∈ (t * , T ], be supremum of times such that i has not agreed to the irrational j's demand. Consider the last units of time prior tot 1 if j has continued to behave like the irrational type, and i has not conceded. Let x be i's expected payoff at timet 1 − (conditional on the deadline not having passed) if j agrees to a deal on terms worse than α j (t) at some t ∈ [t 1 − ,t 1 − (1 − β) ), where β ∈ (0, 1). Let y be i's expected payoff (at timet 1 − ) if j does not agree to such an offer prior tot 1 − (1 − β) . And finally let ξ be the probability that i assigns to the event that j will not agree to such an offer prior tot 1 − (1 − β) .
If agent i optimally rejects 1 − α j (t 1 − ) this implies that:
And so:
At time t ∈ [t 1 − ,t 1 ] conditional on the deadline not having passed by t, a rational agent j can choose to imitate the irrational type, knowing that i must concede before timet 1 to obtain a payoff of at least:
The continuity of the derivative of the above argument means j s minimum payoff is either uniformly increasing or uniformly decreasing close tot 1 . This means that for sufficiently small the minimum payoffs att 1 − and t 1 − (1 − β) are either both achieved at those times or att 1 . Suppose the former. These minimum payoffs for j imply bounds on the payoffs i can expect:
Combining these bounds with equation 26 gives:
However, this in turn creates a contradiction to the assumption of optimal concession against a known irrational agent. Assume therefore that the minimum expected payoffs for agent j att 1 − andt 1 − (1 − β) are found when i does not concede untilt 1 . This creates new bounds on agent i's payoffs:
The second of these bounds implies that y < 1 − α(t 1 − ) whenever:
Rearranging this gives:
Evaluating the limit of the left hand side using l'Hopital's rule as → 0 gives:
This is strictly less than 1 whenever:
By the assumption of optimal concession against an irrational agent, (1 − α j (t 1 )) r i + g(t 1 ) 1−G(t 1 ) > −α j (t 1 ), the above interval is non-empty. This implies x ≥ (1 − α j (t 1 )) > y for a fixed β in the above interval and for sufficiently small . Translating this information into equation 27 implies:
Again taking the limit of the right hand side as → 0 using l'Hopital's rule gives:
And so for any fixed β in the interval given by equation 28, there exists some δ β < 1, such the right hand side of this equation is less than δ β for sufficiently small .
Given this, the probability that agent j continues to play irrationally on the interval [t 1 − ,t 1 − (1 − β) ) must be less than δ β . However, at timet 1 − β the same argument can be repeated on the interval [t 1 − (1 − β) ,t 1 − (1 − β) 2 ). And so the probability of agent j continuing to behave like the irrational type until timet 1 − (1 − β) k must be less than δ k β . For sufficiently large k this means δ k β <z i (t * ). However, the probability of acting like the irrational
given that the irrational type never deviates from her demand. This contradiction means thatt 1 = t * and proves that agent i must concede to agent j immediately at t * .
Proof of Lemma 2
I argue that any equilibrium must satisfy the conditions i)-iii). Letσ = ( 
Notice that the first part proof of Lemma 1 implies that τ i < T . As argued in the text of section 2 if T < T then all agents (rational and irrational) must concede at T and so in all cases τ i ≤ T , that is rational agents must concede weakly before committed ones.
I first make a series of subclaims:
Given that rational agents concede before committed agents this simply says that a rational agent will not delay once she knows that her opponent is committed, which is true by assumption. This proves condition i).
(b) If F i jumps at t < T then F j does not jump at t. If F i had a jump at t, then because bargaining positions are incompatible and continuous and the deadline distribution is continuous at t < T , agent j would receive a strictly higher utility by conceding an instant after t than by conceding at exactly t. This proves condition ii). Furthermore if F i jumps at t ∈ (0, T ) then j cannot concede with positive probability on the interval (t − ε, t] for some ε > 0, because doing so would again forgo an expected profit bump from waiting until just after t.
(c) If a rational agent j does not concede with positive probability on an interval (t 1 ,t 2 ], witht 2 < T then neither does agent i. Conceding at any point on this interval would give agent j a strictly lower payoff than conceding momentarily before that time given the assumption of optimal concession against a know irrational agent
. This in turn implies that for t ∈ (0, T ) there can be no mass concession by either agent, and so any concession on this interval must be continuous. To see this final claim notice that mass concession by i at t induces an interval of non-concession by j on (t − ε, t], with ε > 0 by (b), and I have just argued this means there cannot be concession by agent i on this interval.
(d) If T = τ i then both agents must concede with positive probability on an interval (T − ε, T ), for all sufficiently small ε > 0. Being conceded to at time T is payoff equivalent to conceding, as given continuous bargaining positions demands must be exactly compatible at T . Thus, if the claim were not true, it is without loss of generality to assume that agent j does not concede with positive probability on the interval some (T − ε, T ], which by (c) must induce agent i not to concede on this interval either. More generally, mass concession by j at T does not affect the continuity of i's expected payoffs from conceding at t ∈ (T − ε, T ].
1 K 2 , which means:
With the approximation arbitrarily good for small r i . Notice in particular, that the right hand side is independent of the particular deadline distribution. This proves the fourth claim in the proposition, equation 16, regarding the convergence of the total probability of disagreement 1 − M(T ). The third claim, equation 15, regarding M(T ) − M(T − ε) is then implied by equations 13, 14, and 16. The subordinate claims limM(0)
Proof of Proposition 3
Given a finite set of types, consider any subsequence of rational agent demand choice probabilities µ 1 (α 1 ), µ 2 α 1 (α 2 ) which converge to a limit for each demand combination with α 1 + α 2 > 1. These define limiting posterior probabilities of irrationality forz 1 (α 1 ) andz 2 α 1 (α 2 ). The results of Lemma 3 then immediately follow through for each subgame with α 1 + α 2 > 1 with limz i ∈ (0, 1) for both agents, with z i replaced by limz i in the limiting solutions. In particular this immediately proves claim 18, that no agreements are reached on the interval (0, T − ε] in the limit.
Given this, all that remains to be proved is that there is at least one subgame with α 1 + α 2 > 1, in which limz i < 1 for both agents (it is always true thatz i ≥ z i π i (α i ) for incompatible demands). If that claim is true, then there exists some subgame, which is reached with a probability bounded above z 1 π 1 (α 1 )z 2 π 2 (α 2 ) for large n, such that the total probability of disagreement in that subgame is bounded above z 1 π 1 (α 1 )z 2 π 2 (α 2 ) and the probability of an 11 th hour deal in that subgame bounded above 0.
In particular, I shall prove this for the case of α i = maxC i . Suppose agent 1 did not imitate such type with strictly positive limit probability along some subsequence, thenz 1 → 1. Whenever rational agent 2, makes a counterdemand α 2 > 1 − maxC 1 with strictly positive limit probability, so that limz 2 < 1, then for each such countermand agent 2 must concede in this subgame with probability approaching 1 − limz 2 . To see this, note that agent 1's exhaustion time T 1 must satisfyz
)
K 1 which converges to 1, and so the denominator of¯z 2 ((1−G(T * ))e −r 2 T * ) K 1 = c 2 necessarily also converges to 1, giving the result. This in turn means that agent 1's limiting payoff from (the deviation of) always demanding maxC 1 and conceding an instant after time zero is:
This is however, strictly greater than her best possible payoff from imitating any demand below maxC 1 , given that behavioral types are committed to their demands. This is a contradiction and so 1 must imitate maxC 1 with strictly positive limit probability, so that limz 1 < 1 for this demand.
Similarly, suppose rational agent 2 did not imitate maxC 2 with positive limit probability in response to the demand maxC 1 . This would imply limz 2 → 1 in the subgame with maxC 1 , maxC 2 , which in turn ensures agent 1 would concede with probability approaching 1 − limz 1 > 0 in the limit, following the same reasoning given in the previous paragraph about exhaustion times. This means agent 2's limiting (deviation) payoff from always demanding maxC 2 and conceding an instant after zero is:
Which is strictly better than she could obtain by making any other counterdemand. This contradiction implies limz 2 < 1, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof proceeds in 3 steps. First, I characterize some of the features of an equilibrium with a given (possibly discontinuous) type for agent NR and a Rubinstein type for agent R. Next, I create bounds on the probability of concession by agent NR in that equilibrium at the discrete times t k,+2 . Finally, I proceed to examine the limit of the game as z i n → 0 allowing multiple types.
Step 1:
Consider an equilibrium with a single type for each agent, where R's single type is the Rubinstein demand α R = α R * , and NR's single type is arbitrary α NR . Let F i (t) record the total probability that agent i has conceded or revealed rationality without concession prior to time t, conditional on agent j not having done so. Let u 
Notice that, given continuous demands on the final interval [t m,+2 , T ], the first part of the proof of Lemma 1 shows that τ i < T . Moreover, if T < T then as previously it is without loss of generality to assume that bargaining ends immediately at T even if T = t k,+/−1 , and so, in particular, τ NR ≤ T . We can also assume τ R ≤ T so long as T t k,+/−1 .
Let d i (t) = 1 if agent i can change her demand at time t, and d i (t) = 0 otherwise. This is used to define, for t ∈ [0, T ]:
This is effectively the maximum expected utility that agent R could obtain by waiting from t until some t k ≥ t when agent NR does not concede between t and t k,−2 . Notice that this function is continuous and indeed if φ
I now prove some facts about the nature of the equilibrium.
(a) τ R ≥ τ NR . Given that rational agents concede before committed agents this simply says that a rational agent NR will not delay once she knows that her opponent R is committed. A slight modification of this statement concerns when agent R reaches probability 1 of rationality at t k,−2 , t k,−1 , or t k,+1 in which case NR must certainly have reached probability 1 of irrationality before t k,+2 .
(b) If agent i does not concede with positive probability on some interval (t − ε, t ] ⊆ (t k,+2 , t k+1,−2 ] with t < T and ε > 0, then neither does agent j. Given demands satisfy (1 − α i (t))
g(t)
1−G(t) + r j > −α i (t) on this interval, it is always preferable for j to concede earlier on this interval rather than at any given time on it.
(c) There can be no mass concession by agent i at any t ∈ (t k,+2 , t k+1,−2 ) such that t < T . Suppose there was, then given continuous demands agent j would not concede on the interval (t − ε, t ] for some ε > 0, preferring to wait and receive such concession, which by (b) would then make it optimal for i not to concede at t .
(d) There can be no joint mass concession at any t k,+2 < T , as given incompatible positions, agents would strictly prefer to wait an instant longer to receive such concession.
(e) Agent R cannot concede at any time such that φ R (t) > (1 − α NR (t)), or reveal rationality at t k,+/−1 when φ R (t k,+/−1 ) > v R (t k,+/−1 ). If the inequality holds on some interval (t − ε, t ] ⊆ (t k,+2 , t k+1,−2 ] agent NR cannot concede on that interval either by (b).
(f) There can be no mass concession by agent i at t k,−2 < T . Suppose there was, then agent j must optimally not concede on some interval (t k,−2 − ε, t k,−2 ) for some ε > 0 as conceding at t k,−2 would otherwise give a strictly higher payoff. Hence there must certainly be mass concession by agent j at t k,−2 as well or else by (b) i would not concede at t k,−2 . But then whichever agent has an opportunity to change their demand at t k,−1 would then rather wait to concede at t k,−1 , rather than concede at t k,−2 , a contradiction.
(g) If t k,+2 < T then it is without loss of generality to assume that agent NR does not reveal rationality at times t k,−1 or t k,+1 . Any first revelation by agent NR at these time must amount to concession to the demand α R (t k ). Hence any revelation at time t k,+1 can be instead regarded as happening at time t k,+2 (if R ever conceded with positive mass at t k,+2 NR's revelation would not be optimal). Suppose however NR conceded with positive mass at time t k,−1 . If v R (t k,+1 ) ≥ (1 − α NR (t k,−2 )) then such mass concession will certainly ensure that R does not concede on the interval (t k,−2 − ε, t k,−2 ] for some ε > 0, which by the logic of (c) ensures rational NR would prefer to concede strictly before t k,−1 . Alternatively if v R (t k,+1 ) < (1−α NR (t k,+2 )) then agent R will certainly not reveal rationality (without conceding) at t k,+1 and so NR's t k,−1 concession can again be viewed as occurring at t k,+2 (as if R conceded at t k,+1 or t k,+2 , concession by NR at t k,−1 would be suboptimal).
(h) There can be no mass concession by NR at t k,+2 < T unless either v R (t k,+/−1 ) > (1 − α NR (t k,+2 )) or α NR (t k,+2 ) > α NR (t k,−2 ). Suppose otherwise v R (t k,+/−1 ) ≤ (1 − α NR (t k,+2 )) and α NR (t k,+2 ) ≤ α NR (t k,−2 ), then mass concession by agent NR at t k,+2 is inconsistent with revelation of rationality by R at t k,+/−1 or on (t k,−2 − ε, t k,−2 ] for some ε > 0 (she would prefer to wait). But in which case agent NR would prefer to concede strictly before t k,−2 rather than wait until t k,+2 .
(i) Let [t , t ] ∈ [t k,+2 , t k+1,−2 ] with t < τ NR be such that φ R (t ) < (1 − α NR (t )) then F i (t ) > F i (t ). This states that F i is strictly increasing on X. Suppose not then let t i * = sup{t : F i (t) = Fi(t )} and t * = min{t i * , t j * }. Clearly t * ≥ t by (b). Suppose t i * = t * ∈ (t h,+2 , t h+1,−2 ) for some h, then given no mass concession at t ∈ (t h,+2 , t h+1,−2 ) and (1 − α j (t))
1−G(t) + r i > −α j (t) conceding at t * − ε (for small ε > 0) gives i a strictly higher utility than conceding at or just after t * . If t i * = t * = t h,−2 then i must make probabilistically reveal rationality at t h,−1 (given no mass concession at t h,−2 ). But concession at t h,−1 can give agent i a utility of (1 − α j (t h,−2 )) which must be strictly worse than conceding at t h,−2 − ε, for small ε > 0. Revealing rationality without concession can give agent R a utility of v R (t h,−1 ), but given φ R (t ) < (1 − α NR (t )) this is strictly worse than conceding at t + ε, for small ε > 0. Entirely similar logic rules out t i * = t * = t h,−1 (probabilistic revelation at t h,+1 ). Suppose then t i * = t * = t h,+2 by (d) at least one agent, say j does not concede with positive probability at t h,+2 . In this case agent i would again strictly prefer to concede at t + ε, for small ε > 0, than waiting to concede at t h,+2 ; again this follows from φ R (t ) < (1 − α NR (t )) and the optimality of concession against a known Rubinstein type: (1 − α R (t )) > (1 − α R (t * ))e −r NR (t * −t ) 1−G(t * )
1−G(t ) . (j) If T = τ
i ∈ (t k,+2 , t k+1,−2 ] then both agents must concede with positive probability on an interval (T − ε, T ), for all sufficiently small ε > 0. This follows for the same reason as in Lemma 2. Being conceded to at time T must be payoff equivalent to conceding, given that continuous bargaining positions on this interval mean that demands must be exactly compatible at T .
(k) If T = t k,−1 or T = t k,+1 then τ NR < T . Mutually compatible positions at T then imply φ R (t k,−2 ) ≥ α R (t k ) > (1 − α NR (t k,−2 )), ensuring agent R cannot concede on (t k,−2 − ε, t k,−2 ] for some ε > 0. Equally, rational agent NR's continuation payoff in the game conditional at t k,−2 must in all cases be less than (1−α R (t k )) which means that conceding strictly prior to t k,−2 must be better than waiting until that time. (1 − α NR (s)) r R +
g(s)
1−G(s) + α NR (s)
) is the probability of concession by NR at t k,+2 . A similar expression can be given for agent R additionally incorporating revelation of rationality at t k,+/−1 , however, in fact it is sufficient to consider the following bound on agent R's probability of rationality at time t ≤ τ R :
1 [s∈X] (1 − α R (s)) r NR +
1−G(s) + α R (s)
Step 2:
The next task is creating bounds on the probability of concession by NR at t k,+2 ∈ (0, τ NR ]. Suppose that (t k,−2 − ε, t k,−2 ) ⊆ X ∩ (0, τ NR ] for some ε > 0 and so also by continuity φ R (t k,−2 ) ≤ (1 − α NR (t k,−2 )). The first task is to show that:
The second inequality must certainly hold given incompatible demands at t k,+2 (which is implied by (t k,−2 − ε, t k,−2 ) ⊂ X ∩ (0, τ NR ]). Suppose the first inequality did not hold, then agent R would strictly prefer to wait and concede an instant after t k,+2 rather than concede herself on the interval (t k,−2 − , t k,−2 ) for sufficiently small > 0. This contradicts that F i is increasing on that interval.
Next suppose that t k,−2 −ε X with t k,−2 < min{T , τ NR } (for small ε > 0), and lett = in f {t : F R (t) > F R (t k,−2 −ε)} > t k,−2 . Necessarily,t ∈ {t h,−1 , t h,+1 , t h,+2 } for some h ≥ k, with F NR (t k,−2 ) = F NR (t), and there must be probabilistic revelation of rationality by agent R att: if not, then agent NR would prefer to concede at t k,−2 − ε. Supposet = t h,+2 then clearly c NR h,+2 = 1, as NR would then strictly prefer to wait to concede an instant after t h,+2 in order to receive R's mass concession. Alternatively, supposet ∈ {t h,−1 , t h,+1 } and c NR h,+2 < 1, then we may assume v R (t) > (1 − α NR (t h,+2 )) or else rational R would not reveal rationality att but wait until just after t h,+2 . Under this assumption:
Suppose the first inequality did not hold, in this case agent R would not find it optimal to concede att but would instead wait until an instant after t h,+2 in the hope of receiving such mass concession, contradicting the definition oft as the supremum.
To show the second inequality, suppose it does not hold so that α R (t) ≤ v R (t). This must imply v NR (t) ≤ (1 − α R (t)). But for NR to find it optimal to concede at t h,+2 to the demand (1 − α R (t)) instead of at t h,−2 − for small > 0 implies:
(1 − α R (t h,−2 − )) ≤ (1 − α R (t))e −r NR (t−t h,+2 + )
− G(t) − G(t h,+2 − )
But this cannot hold, given the optimality of immediate concession against a known Rubinstein type.
The above argument can also be extended to show that for a sequence of equilibria (taking subsequences if necessary) that limc NR h,+2 ≥ ε > 0. Suppose not, then consider the sequence t h,−2 − n X (for small n > 0) with mass concession bounded by equation 29. This will lead to a uniform positive bound on c NR h,+2 unless limv R (t) = α R (t), which in turn means that limv NR (t) ≤ (1 − α R (t)), wheret ∈ {t h,−1 , t h,+1 }. Given α R (t) + α NR (t h,−2 ) > 1 there exists an > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n agent R will not concede on [t h,−2 − , t h,−2 ]. Using the same argument as above then shows that for sufficiently large n, agent NR would then strictly prefer to concede at t h,−2 − rather than wait until t h,−2 to receive a payoff arbitrarily close to (1 − α R (t)), given the bound on the rate of decline of agent R's demand. This is a contradiction.
Step 3:
Consider a sequence of equilibria as z i n → 0 when rational agent NR imitates some type such that α NR (0) + α R (0) > 1 with positive limit probability (taking a subsequence if necessary), this implies that there is a bound z NR n z R n < L 2 on agents initial probabilities of irrationality close to the limit, even when a rational agent R imitates her Rubinstein demand with probability 1. Again considering a subsequence if necessary, let limτ NR exist. Along this (sub)sequence: (1 − α NR (s)) r R +
g(s)
Asz NR n → 0, the bound on concession at all t k,+2 ≤ τ NR , c NR k,+2 ≥ ε for some ε > 0, as well as the bound on continuous concession rates away from T in region X, implies that either c NR 0,+2 → 0 or τ NR → T ∈ (t k ,+2 , t k +1,−2 ] for some k , where k = m if T = T . The first of these would mean that agent NR conceded to R at time zero with probability approaching 1 in the limit.
